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Abstract
The foundation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is a model of price
setting with nominal rigidities which implies that the dynamics of inﬂation are
well explained by the evolution of real marginal costs. The objective of this pa-
per is to analyze whether this is a structurally-invariant relationship. To assess
this, we ﬁrst estimate an unrestricted time-series model for inﬂation, unit labor
costs, and other variables, and present evidence that their joint dynamics are
well represented by a vector autoregression with drifting coeﬃcients and volatil-
ities, as in Cogley and Sargent (2004). Then, following Sbordone (2002, 2003),
we apply a two-step minimum distance estimator to estimate deep parameters.
Taking as given estimates of the unrestricted VAR, we estimate parameters
of the NKPC by minimizing a quadratic function of the restrictions that the
theoretical model imposes on the reduced form. Our results suggest that it is
possible to reconcile a constant-parameter NKPC with the drifting-parameter
VAR, and therefore we argue that the price-setting model is structurally in-
variant.
JEL Classiﬁcation:E 3 1
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Much of the modern analysis of inﬂation is based on the New Keynesian Phillips
curve, a model of price setting with nominal rigidities which implies that the dynamics
of inﬂation are well explained by the expected evolution of real marginal costs. A large
empirical literature has been devoted to estimating the parameters of this curve, both
as a single equation and in the context of general equilibrium models1.O n ep o i n to f
debate concerns whether the model can account for the persistence in inﬂation which
is detected in the data. A common view is that this is possible insofar as a large
enough backward-looking component is allowed. However, from a theoretical point
of view this is not too satisfactory, since dependence on past inﬂation is introduced
as an ad hoc feature.
Here we reconsider estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in light of
recent evidence from reduced form analyses that show signiﬁcant instability in the
parameters of the inﬂation process. In particular, Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2004)
use a vector autoregression model with random-walk coeﬃcients to describe inﬂation-
unemployment dynamics in the U.S. and ﬁnd strong evidence of coeﬃcient drift. They
interpret this as a reﬂection of the process by which policymakers learn the true model
of the economy. A related debate has ensued on whether the more muted response of
inﬂation and output to monetary policy in the 90’s is due to a change in the conduct
of monetary policy or to a change in the size of the shocks; see Bernanke and Mihov
(1998), Stock and Watson (2002), Boivin and Giannoni (2002), and Sims and Zha
(2004), among others.2
The question we ask in this paper is whether the NKPC can be regarded as a
structural model of inﬂation dynamics in the sense of Lucas (1976), viz. whether
the deep parameters that govern the evolution of inﬂation are invariant to changes
in monetary policy rules, at least over the range experienced after World War II in
the U.S.3 Among other things, we investigate whether variation in trend inﬂation
alters estimates of key pricing parameters, how well a constant-parameter version
of the NKPC approximates the evolving law of motion for inﬂation, how the new
estimates alter the relative importance of forward- and backward-looking elements in
the NKPC, and how the new estimates accord with microeconomic evidence on price
changes.
1Among others: Gali and Gertler (1999), Sbordone (2002, 2003), Kurmann (2002), and Linde’
(2002) for the U.S., Batini et al. (2002) for the U.K., Gagnon and Khan (2003) for Canada,
Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2000) for the Euro area . For estimates in the context of general
equilibrium models see Smets and Wouters (2002), Christiano et al. (2003), and Edge et al. (2003).
2For example, Sims and Zha argue that there is very little evidence for regime switching in the
conditional mean parameters, but strong evidence for regime switching in structural disturbances.
3Our analysis does not address whether they are invariant to more extreme interventions. We
doubt, for example, that the pricing parameters we estimate from recent U.S. data would well
approximate hyperinﬂationary regimes.
2To address these questions, we consider an extension of the discrete-time Calvo
(1983) model of staggered price setting, with partial price indexation and strategic
complementarities, and consider the form of its approximate solution in the case of
non-zero steady-state inﬂation. This formulation allows us to consider the eﬀects that
diﬀerent policy regimes, which we associate with diﬀerent levels of trend inﬂation,
have on the relationship between inﬂation and marginal costs.
Our approach to estimation follows Sbordone (2002, 2003) by exploiting the cross-
equation restrictions of the extended Calvo pricing model for a reduced form VA R .
The wrinkle is that in this paper the reduced form VA Rhas drifting parameters, as in
Cogley and Sargent (2004). The estimation is in two steps. In the ﬁrst, we estimate an
unrestricted time series representation for the variables that drive inﬂation. This is a
time-varying VA Rfor inﬂation, the labor share, GDP growth, and the federal funds
rate (expressed on a discount basis), which is estimated as in Cogley and Sargent
(2004) with U.S. data from 1960:1 to 2003:4. Then we estimate deep parameters by
trying to satisfy the cross-equation restrictions implied by the theoretical model. If
we can reconcile a constant-parameter NKPC with the drifting-parameter VAR,w e
say the price-setting model is structurally invariant.
Our estimates point to four conclusions. First, a constant-parameter version of
a generalized Calvo model can indeed be reconciled with a drifting-parameter VA R .
More than that, the model provides an excellent ﬁtt ot h ei n ﬂation gap. Second,
although there is some weak evidence of changes in the frequency of price adjustment
over time, the evidence falls short of statistical signiﬁcance. Third, our estimates of
the backward-looking indexation parameter concentrate on zero, suggesting that a
purely forward-looking version of the model ﬁts best. Finally, our estimates of the
frequency of price adjustment are not too far from those of Bils and Klenow (2004),
so the macro and micro evidence is in accord.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section derives the inﬂation dynamics
for an extended Calvo model and characterizes the cross-equation restrictions that
form the basis for the estimation. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology in
more detail, section 4 discusses evidence on parameter drift in the VA R ,and section
5 estimates and assesses the structural parameters. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Calvo model with positive trend inﬂation
The typical inﬂation equation derived from the Calvo model is obtained as a log-
linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions around a steady state with zero
inﬂation. The model therefore has implications for small ﬂuctuations around the
steady state (it links second moments of inﬂation and real marginal costs). Because
we want to investigate the behavior of the model across possibly diﬀerent policy
regimes, and therefore want to allow for shifts in trend inﬂation, we consider a log-
3linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions around a non-zero level of inﬂation.
We show below that, unless there is perfect indexation of prices to the past level of
inﬂation, the Calvo dynamics are more complicated, and the pricing model also has
predictions for the long-run relationship between trend inﬂation and marginal cost.4
We start with the standard Calvo set-up of monopolistic competition and stag-
gered price setting. We denote by (1 − α) the probability of setting price optimally,
with 0 <α<1, a n dw ea l l o wt h ef r a c t i o nα of ﬁrms that do not reoptimize to
partially index their price to the inﬂation level of the previous period. We denote by
  the indexation parameter, with   [0,1]. Finally, we do not allow capital to be re-
allocated instantaneously across ﬁrms, and therefore take into account a discrepancy
between individual and aggregate marginal costs.





















































The notation is as follows: Xt is the relative price set by the representative optimizing
ﬁrm, and xt = Xt/Pt denotes its relative price; St is the aggregate nominal marginal
cost, and st = St/Pt denotes real marginal cost; Pt is the aggregate price level, and
πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross rate of inﬂation; γyt = Yt/Yt−1 is the gross rate of output
growth, and Rt,t+j is a nominal discount factor between time t and t+j. In addition
to the parameters α and   already introduced, θ is the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of
substitution among diﬀerentiated goods, and ω is the elasticity of marginal cost to
ﬁrms’ own output. The parameter ω enters the equilibrium condition (1) because
we assume ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital: this assumption implies that the marginal cost of
the optimizing ﬁrm diﬀers from aggregate marginal cost by a function of its relative
price, weighted by θω.6
Evaluating these two conditions at a steady state with gross inﬂation rate π, we
4F e ws t u d i e si nt h el i t e r a t u r ea n a l y z et h ep o l i c yi s s u e st h a ta r i s ei nt h ec o n t e x to ft h eC a l v o
model when one allows for trend inﬂation. See for ex. Bakhshi et al. (2003), Sahuc (2004) and
Ascari (2004).
5We provide the main results in the text, and some derivations in the appendix.
6The coeﬃcient ω is particularly important because it aﬀects whether there are strategic com-
plementarities in pricing (see Woodford 2003).






1 − αRγyπ1+θ(1− )(1+ω)










Here we have deﬁned by R the one-period steady-state discount factor and by γy the
steady-state growth rate of output.7
The extended Calvo equation is an approximate equilibrium condition obtained
by log-linearizing conditions (1) and (2) around a steady-state with inﬂation π and
then combining the results:




1 b πt+j (4)
+χ(γ2 − γ1)(P ˆ Rt + Pˆ γyt)+ut.




1 b Rt+j,t+j+1, (5)





With standard notation, hat variables denote log-deviations from steady state values;
i.e., for any variable xt, b xt =l o g ( xt/x). We include an error term ut to account
for the fact that this equation is an approximation and to allow for other possible
misspeciﬁcations.
The coeﬃcients of (4) are functions of the vector of structural parameters ψ =























































7As we explain in appendix A, equation (3) involves some additional conditions on α, ,θ, and
the steady-state values ¯ π, ¯ R, and ¯ γy that are necessary in order that certain present values converge.
Our estimates always satisfy those conditions.
8The parameter e β = qγy, where q is the steady state value of qt,t+j, a real discount factor between
period t and t + j.S i n c eq = Rπ, one can also write e β = Rπγy.





γ1 = αe βξ1,
γ2 = αe βξ2, (7)











[γ2 (1 + θω)+( γ2 − γ1)(θ(1 −  γ1)+ γ1)].
Compared with the standard Calvo equation, obtained as an approximation around
a point with zero inﬂation (π = 1), relationship (4) includes, on the right-hand side,
further leads of expected inﬂation as well as expectations of output growth and the
discount rate far into the future. The standard Calvo equation emerges as a special
case of (4) when π = 1 (zero steady state inﬂation), or   = 1 (perfect indexation). In
that case, ξ1 = ξ2 =1 , implying γ1 = γ2 = αe β and causing the terms in b Rt+j,t+j+1





































We may draw various implications from a comparison of the coeﬃcients deﬁned
in (6) with those deﬁned in (8). For example, the presence of additional terms in
equation (4) may create an omitted-variable bias in the estimate of the coeﬃcient
of marginal cost in the traditional Calvo equation, should the omitted terms be
correlated with the marginal cost term. We comment more on this comparison later.
Here we want to emphasize the fact that the response of inﬂation to current
marginal cost does vary with trend inﬂation. Indeed, none of the coeﬃcients of the
generalized Calvo equation, as deﬁned in (6), are time invariant when trend inﬂation
varies over time (provided   6= 1). But it could still be the case that the underlying
parameters of the Calvo model, α, , and θ, are stable. These parameters govern
key behavioral attributes involving the frequency of price adjustment, the extent of
6indexation to past inﬂation, and the elasticity of demand. In the estimation discussed
below, we allow the parameters (6) to vary with trend inﬂation, and we explore the
time invariance of α, , and θ. In particular, we evaluate whether it is still possible,
in an environment characterized by a changing level of trend inﬂation, to ﬁtt ot h e
data a Calvo model in which frequency of price adjustment, degree of indexation, and
elasticity of demand remain constant.
3 Empirical methodology
The previous section shows that, when derived as an approximate equilibrium
condition around a non-zero value for trend inﬂation, the generalized Calvo model
i m p o s e sr e s t r i c t i o n so nb o t ht h es t e a d y - s tate values and cyclical components of in-
ﬂation and real marginal cost. These restrictions are encoded in equation (3) and
(4), respectively. In addition, the NKPC parameters are themselves functions of the
underlying parameters
ψ =[ α e βθ ωπ]
0, (9)
a ss h o w ni ne q u a t i o n( 6 ) .I nt h i ss e c t i o n ,w ee x p l a i nh o wt oe s t i m a t ee l e m e n t so fψ
by exploiting conditions (3), (4), and (6). We are particularly interested in α, , and
θ.9
Following Sbordone (2002, 2003), we adopt a two-step procedure for estimating
these parameters. First we ﬁt a reduced-form VA Rto summarize the dynamic prop-
erties of inﬂation, real marginal cost, and the other variables that enter the generalized
Calvo equation. Then we estimate α, , and θ by exploiting the cross-equation restric-
tions that the extended Calvo model implies for the VA R .T h ec h i e fd i ﬀerence from
Sbordone (2002, 2003) is that we model the reduced form as a time-varying VA R ,i n
order to allow for the possibility of structural breaks. The breaks are manifested as
changes in trend inﬂation, among other things, and our working hypothesis is that
they reﬂect changes in monetary policy.
To illustrate our methodology, we consider ﬁrst the case where the reduced form
model is a VA Rwith constant parameters, and then show its extension to the case
of a random coeﬃcients VA Rmodel. Suppose the joint representation of the vector
time series xt =
¡
πt,s t,R t,γyt
¢0 is a VA R (p). Then, deﬁn i n gav e c t o rzt =( xt,
xt−1,...,xt−p+1)0, we can write the law of motion of zt in companion form as
zt = µ + Azt−1 + εzt. (10)
From this process, we can express the conditional expectation of the inﬂation gap as
E (b πt|b zt−1)=e
0
πAb zt−1, (11)
9As we explain below, ω is calibrated, and e βt and πt are calculated from the reduced-form
estimates.
7w h e r ew eu s et h en o t a t i o nek for a selection vector that picks up variable k in vector
zt (ek is a column vector with 1 in the position corresponding to variable k,a n dz e r o
otherwise), and b zt = zt − µz, where µz =( I − A)−1µ.10.
The vector zt also contains all the other variables that drive inﬂation, so we can
use (10) to compute all the conditional expectations that appear on the right-hand
side of (4). Furthermore, we can obtain the conditional expectation of the inﬂation
gap according to the model, by projecting the whole right hand side of (4) on ˆ zt−1;
the resulting expression for the expected inﬂation gap contains by construction all the
restrictions of the theoretical model. Speciﬁcally, from expression (4), one obtains11
E (b πt|b zt−1)=e  e
0
πb zt−1 + ζe
0
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Equating the right-hand sides of (11) and (12), and observing that the equality must
hold for any value of ˆ zt−1, we obtain a set of nonlinear cross-equation restrictions on
the companion matrix A,
e
0





















The left-hand side of this equation follows from the conditional expectation of inﬂation
implied by the unrestricted reduced-form model, and it reﬂects relationships that
we estimate freely from the data. The right-hand side follows from the conditional
expectation implied by the model; it deﬁnes a function g(A,ψ) of the deep parameters
ψ and the parameters of the VA R .We then deﬁne the diﬀerence between the ‘data’
and the ‘model’ as
z1(µ,A,ψ)=e
0
πA − g(A,ψ). (14)
Furthermore, we use equation (3), which relates the steady-state values of inﬂation







1 − αRγyπ1+θ(1− )(1+ω)











where ¯ π and ¯ s are computed from the mean values of inﬂation and real marginal
cost, respectively, implied by the VAR. We consolidate the ﬁrst- and second-moment
conditions by deﬁning z(µ,A,ψ)=( z0
1 z0
2)0.
10This implies that b zt = Ab zt−1 + εzt.
11See Appendix A. This expression is obtained by calculating all the expectations in (4) as con-
ditional expectations, given b zt−1, under the assumption that E (ut|b zt−1)=0 .
8If the model is true, there exists a ψ that satisﬁes z(·,ψ)=0 . Accordingly,
we estimate the free elements of ψ b ys e a r c h i n gf o rav a l u et h a tm a k e sz(ψ)a s
small as possible, where ‘small’ is deﬁned in terms of an unweighted sum-of-squares
z(·,ψ)





In what follows, we implement this estimator with a time-varying VA R . With
drifting parameters, we modify the previous formulas by adding time subscripts to
the companion form,
zt = µt + Atzt−1 + εzt, (17)
and by appropriately redeﬁning the function z as zt(·,ψ) to represent the restrictions
z(µt,A t,ψ) at a particular date. After selecting a number of representative dates,











Then we estimate the parameters by minimizing the unweighted sum of squares F0F.
We estimate two versions of the model, one in which we allow ψ to diﬀer across
dates (i.e., in which case the restrictions are zt(·)=z(µt,A t,ψ t)), and another in
which we hold ψ constant (zt(·)=z(µt,A t,ψ)). Our objective is to see whether the
data support the hypothesis that the parameters of the Calvo model are structurally
invariant, i.e., ψt = ψ.
Further details on the second-stage estimator are provided in section 5. Before
illustrating the results, however, we discuss the methodology by which we estimate a
time-varying VA Rand report some evidence on parameter drift.
4 A VAR with drifting parameters
This section documents the time drifting nature of the joint process of inﬂation
and marginal costs. Under the hypothesis of a non-zero level of trend inﬂation, the
dynamics of inﬂation depend not only on the evolution of marginal costs, but also
on the evolution of output growth and the discount rate. We therefore estimate a
Bayesian vector autoregression with drifting coeﬃcients and stochastic volatilities for
the log of gross inﬂation, log marginal cost, output growth, and a discount rate.
The methodology for estimating the reduced form follows Cogley and Sargent
(2004). We begin by writing the VA Ras
xt = X
0
tϑt + εxt, (19)
12The problem would be too high-dimensional if we used all the dates.
9where ϑt denotes a vector of time-varying conditional mean parameters.13 In the
companion-form notation used above, the matrix At refers to the autoregressive pa-
rameters in ϑt, and the vector µt includes the intercepts. As in Cogley and Sargent, ϑt
is assumed to evolve as a driftless random walk subject to reﬂecting barriers. Apart
from the reﬂecting barrier, ϑt evolves as
ϑt = ϑt−1 + vt. (20)
The innovation vt is normally distributed, with mean 0 and variance Q.D e n o t i n gb y
ϑ























Associated with this is a marginal prior f(Q)t h a tm a k e sQ an inverse-Wishart vari-
ate.




function I(ϑs) takes a value of 0 when the roots of the associated VA Rpolynomial
are inside the unit circle, and it is equal to 1 otherwise. This restriction truncates





This represents a stability condition for the VA R , which rules out explosive repre-
sentations for the variables in question. Explosive representations might be useful
for modeling hyperinﬂationary economies, but we regard them as implausible for the
post World War II U.S.





where ξt is a standard normal vector, which we assume to be independent of param-





13xt is a N × 1 vector of endogenous variables (N = 4 in our case), and X0







t−l denoting lagged values of xt.
14This is a multivariate version of the stochastic volatility model of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi
(1994).
10where Ht is diagonal and B is lower triangular. The diagonal elements of Ht are
assumed to be independent, univariate stochastic volatilities that evolve as driftless
geometric random walks
lnhit =l nhit−1 + σiηit. (25)
The innovations ηit have a standard normal distribution, are independently dis-
tributed, and are assumed independent of innovations vt and ξt. The random walk
speciﬁcation for hit is chosen to represent permanent shifts in innovation variance, as
those emphasized in the literature about the reduction in volatility in US economic
time series (see, for example, McConnell and Perez Quiros, 2000).15
We work with a VA R (2) representation, estimated using data from 1960.Q1
through 2003.Q4. Data from 1954.Q1-1959.Q4 were used to initialize the prior. The
posterior distribution for VA Rparameters was simulated using Markov Chain Monte
Carlo methods. Appendix B sketches the simulation algorithm; for a more extensive
discussion, see Cogley and Sargent (2004).
4.1 The data
As noted above, the model depends on the joint behavior of four variables: in-
ﬂation, real marginal cost, output growth, and a nominal discount factor. Inﬂation
is measured from the implicit GDP deﬂator, recorded in NIPA table 1.3.4. Output
growth is calculated using chain-weighted real GDP, expressed in 2000$, and season-
ally adjusted at an annual rate. This series is recorded in NIPA table 1.3.6. The
nominal discount factor is constructed by expressing the federal funds rate on a dis-
count basis. Federal funds data were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic
Database; they are monthly averages of daily ﬁgures and were converted to quarterly
values by point-sampling the middle month of each quarter.
That leaves real marginal cost. Under the hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas technology,
real marginal cost, s, is proportional to unit labor cost,
s = wH/(1 − a)PY =( 1− a)
−1ulc, (26)
where 1−a is the output elasticity to hours of work in the production function.16 In
previous work, Sbordone (2002, 2003) used an index number constructed by the BLS
to measure unit labor cost in the non-farm business sector. That is ﬁne for studying
gap relationships, because a change of units does not alter percent diﬀerences from a
steady state, but here we also exploit a restriction on ¯ s, and that requires expressing
s in its natural units.
15The factorization in (24) and the log speciﬁcation in (25) guarantee that Vt is positive deﬁnite,
w h i l et h ef r e ep a r a m e t e r si nB allow for correlation among the VA Rinnovations εxt.T h em a t r i x
B orthogonalizes εxt, but it is not an identiﬁcation scheme.
16This follows from the fact that the marginal product of labor is proportional to the average
product.
11To construct such a measure, we compute an index of total compensation in the
non-farm business sector from BLS indices of nominal compensation and total hours
of work, then translate the result into dollars. Because we lack the right data for
the non-farm business sector, we perform the translation using data for private sector
labor compensation, which we obtained from table B28 of the Economic Report of the
President (2004). From that table, we calculated total labor compensation in dollars
for 2002;17 the number for that year comes to $4978.61 billion. The BLS compensation
index is then rescaled so that the new compensation series has that value in 2002.
A (log) measure of real unit labor costs ulc is then obtained by subtracting (log of)
nominal GDP from (log of) labor compensation. The correlation of this measure of
ulc with Sbordone’s original measure is 0.9979, so this is almost entirely just a change
in units. The new measure therefore accordsv e r yw e l lw i t ht h eo n eu s e di np r e v i o u s
work.
Finally, to transform the real unit labor cost (or labor share) into real marginal
cost, we subtract the log exponent on labor, (1 − a), which we set equal to 0.7. This
also pins down the strategic complementarity parameter ω, f o ri nam o d e ls u c ha s
this ω = a/(1−a). Since a is calibrated when constructing a measure of real marginal
cost, ω is no longer free for estimation.
4.2 Calibrating the Priors
Next we describe how the VA Rpriors are calibrated. As in Cogley and Sargent,
our guiding principle is to make the priors proper but weakly informative, so that
the posterior mainly reﬂects information in the data. Our settings follow theirs quite
closely. We begin by assuming that hyperparameters and initial states are indepen-
dent across blocks, so that the joint prior can be expressed as the product of marginal
priors. Then we separately calibrate each of the marginal priors.
Our prior for ϑ0 is
p(ϑ0) ∝ I(ϑ0)f(ϑ0)=I(ϑ0)N(¯ ϑ, ¯ P), (27)
where the mean and variance of the Gaussian piece are set by estimating a time-
invariant vector autoregression using data from the training sample 1954.Q3-1959.Q4.
We set ¯ ϑ equal to the point estimate from those regressions and the variance ¯ P to
the asymptotic variance of that estimate.
For the innovation variance Q, we adopt an inverse-Wishart prior,
f(Q)=IW( ¯ Q
−1,T 0). (28)
17Column D of table B28 reports private wages and salaries in dollars; to that we add a fraction
from column G, supplements to wages and salaries. That fraction was calculated as the ratio of
private to total wages. This is an attempt to remove government from column G; the assumption is
that the ratio of private to total is the same for wages and salaries as for supplements.
12In order to minimize the weight of the prior, the degree-of-freedom parameter T0 is
set to the minimum for which the prior is proper,
T0 =d i m ( θt)+1 . (29)
To calibrate the scale matrix ¯ Q, we assume
¯ Q = γ
2 ¯ P (30)
and set γ2 = 1.25e-04. This makes ¯ Q comparable to the value used in Cogley and
Sargent (2004), adjusting for the increased dimension of this model.
The parameters governing stochastic-volatility priors are set as follows. The prior
for hi0 is log-normal,
f(lnhi0)=N(ln¯ hi,10), (31)
where ¯ hi is the initial estimate of the residual variance of variable i. A variance of 10
on a natural-log scale makes this weakly informative for hi0. The prior for b is also
normal with a large variance,
f(b)=N(0,10000 · I3). (32)
Finally, the prior for σ2










This also puts a heavy weight on sample information, for (33) does not possess ﬁnite
moments.
4.3 Evidence on parameter drift
With these priors, the posterior was simulated using the Markov Chain Monte
Carlo algorithm outlined in Appendix B. The variables were ordered as logγyt,
logst, logπt,R t; exploring the sensitivity of our results to the ordering is left to
future research.
4.3.1 Structure of Drift in ϑt
For a ﬁrst piece of evidence on drift in ϑt, we inspect the structure of the inno-
vation variance Q. Recall that this matrix governs the pattern and rate of drift in
the conditional mean parameters. Table 1 records the principle components of its
posterior mean.
Cogley and Sargent found that patterns of drift in ϑ were highly structured, with
Q having only a few non-zero principal components, and the same is true here. The
matrix Q is 36 × 36, but the posterior mean has only 4 or 5 signiﬁcant principal
components. That means many linear combinations of ϑ are approximately time
invariant. In other words, there are stable and unstable subspaces of ϑ.
13Table 1
Principal components of Q
Variance Cumulative Proportion of tr(Q)
PC 1 0.0554 0.637
PC 2 0.0132 0.789
PC 3 0.0065 0.864
PC 4 0.0057 0.930
PC 5 0.0016 0.947
PC 6 0.0011 0.961
PC 7 0.0010 0.972
PC 8 0.0007 0.980
PC 9 0.0005 0.985
This is also illustrated in ﬁgure 1, which portrays partial sums of the principal
component for ∆ϑt|T. It shows rotations of the mean VA Rparameters, sorted by
degree of time variation. A few move around a lot, the rest are approximately constant
throughout the sample.
































Figure 1: Principal Components of ϑ
From the eigenvectors associated with the ﬁrst 5 components no obvious pattern
or simple interpretation of the factors responsible for the variation in ϑ emerges.
Nevertheless, that the drift is structured is an intriguing clue about the source of
time variation, for it suggests that many components of a general equilibrium model
are likely to be invariant. If changes in monetary policy are indeed behind the drifting
components in ϑ, then many other features are likely to be structural. We are curious
whether Calvo-pricing parameters are among the invariant features.
144.3.2 Trend Inﬂation and the Persistence of the Inﬂation Gap
Next we turn to evidence on trend inﬂation, ln ¯ πt, and the inﬂation gap, ln(πt/¯ πt).
Trend inﬂation is estimated as in Cogley and Sargent by calculating a local-to-date t
estimate of mean inﬂation from the VA R ,




The arrays µt|T and At|T denote posterior mean estimates of the intercepts and au-
toregressive parameters, respectively. Figure 2 portrays estimates of trend inﬂation,
s h o w na sar e dl i n e ,a n dc o m p a r e si tw i t ha c t u a li n ﬂation and mean inﬂation. The
latter are recorded in blue and green, respectively, and all are expressed at annual
rates












Figure 2: Inﬂation, Mean Inﬂation, and Trend Inﬂation
Two features of the graph are relevant for what comes later. The ﬁrst, of course,
is that trend inﬂation varies in our sample. We estimate that ln ¯ πt rose from 2.3
percent in the early 1960s to roughly 4.75 percent in the 1970s, then fell to around
1.65 percent at the end of the sample. A conventional Calvo model explains inﬂation
gaps, which are usually represented in terms of deviations from a constant mean,18
but if trend inﬂation varies, as the data suggest, the appropriate measure of inﬂation
gap is the deviation from its time-varying trend. Accordingly, we aim at modeling a
trend-based inﬂation gap.
The second feature concerns the degree of inﬂation gap persistence. How the
inﬂation gap is measured — whether as deviations from the mean or from a time-
varying trend — matters because that aﬀects the degree of persistence. As the ﬁgure
18In general equilibrium, mean inﬂation is usually pinned down by the target in the central bank’s
policy rule.
15illustrates, the mean-based gap is more persistent than the trend-based measure.
Notice, for example, the long runs at the beginning, middle, and end of the sample
when inﬂation does not cross the mean. In contrast, inﬂation crosses the trend line
more often, especially after 1985. One of the puzzles in the literature concerns whether
conventional Calvo models can generate enough persistence to match mean-based
measures of the gap. A backward-looking element is often added to accomplish this.
Figure 2 makes us wonder whether this ‘excess persistence’ reﬂects an exaggeration of
the persistence of mean-based gaps rather than a deﬁciency of persistence in forward-
looking models. We comment more on this below.
The ﬁgure also suggests that the degree of persistence in the trend-based inﬂation
gap is not constant over the sample. For example, there are also long runs at the
beginning and the middle of the sample in which inﬂation does not cross the trend,
while there are many more crossings after 1985. This suggests a decrease in inﬂa-
tion persistence after the Volcker disinﬂation. Indeed, the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
for the trend-based inﬂation gap is 0.75 prior to 1985 and 0.34 thereafter. Changes
in inﬂation persistence may also be part of the resolution of the persistence puz-
zle. For instance, the ‘excess persistence’ found in time-invariant models may have
disappeared from the data after the Volcker disinﬂation.
Figures 3a and 3b provide another measure of inﬂation persistence, showing the
normalized spectrum of inﬂation. This is calculated as in Cogley and Sargent (2004)
from a local-to-date t approximation to the spectrum for inﬂation. The normalized















Once again, the arrays At|T and Vt|T represent posterior means, which are calculated
by averaging across the Monte Carlo distribution. In ﬁgure 3a, time is plotted on
the x-axis, frequency on the y-axis, and power on the z-axis. Figure 3b reports slices
along the x-axis for three selected years.
With this normalization,19 a white noise process has a constant spectrum equal
to 1 at all frequencies. Relative to this benchmark, excess power at low frequencies
signiﬁes positive autocorrelation or persistence, and deﬁcient power at low frequencies
represents negative autocorrelation or anti-persistence. The spectra shown here all
have more power at low frequencies than a white noise variate, so there is always
positive persistence in the trend-based gap.
19Notice that we adopt a diﬀerent normalization than in Cogley and Sargent (2004). Their

























Figure 3a: Normalized Spectrum for Inﬂation
































Figure 3b: Normalized Spectrum (selected years)
What varies is the degree of persistence. Th er i s ea n df a l li nl o w - f r e q u e n c yp o w e r
signiﬁes a changing degree of autocorrelation. To help interpret the ﬁgures, it is
convenient to compare them with an AR(1) benchmark, for which the normalized
spectrum at zero can be expressed in terms of the autoregressive parameter ρ,
g(0) = (1 + ρ)/(1 − ρ). (37)
The normalized spectrum at zero was approximately 6 in the early 1960s, 14 in the late
1970s, and 8 in the 1990s and early 2000s. Those values correspond to autoregressive
17roots of 0.71, 0.87, and 0.78, respectively, or half-lives of 2.43, 5.20, and 3.12 quarters.
Thus, while there is some variation in inﬂation persistence, it is not too dramatic.20
5 Estimates of deep parameters
Next we turn to the deep parameters ψ =[ α,e β,θ, ,ω,π] that determine the
coeﬃcients of the generalized Calvo equation (4). We estimate deep parameters by
searching for values which reconcile that equation with the reduced-form VA R .
We begin by noting that three elements of ψ are already determined by other
conditions. Trend inﬂation πt is estimated from the reduced-form VA Rparameters.
The value corresponding to the i − th draw from the VA Rposterior is 21






I − At|T (i)
¤−1 µt|T (i)
´
where µt|T (i)a n dAt|T (i) represent the i−th draw in the VA Rposterior sample, and
i =1 ,...,NMC, where NMC is the total number of draws in the Monte Carlo sample.
The discount parameter e β is also a byproduct of VA Restimation. Recall that
e β is deﬁned as e β = γyq = γyRπ,w h e r eγy is the steady-state gross rate of output
growth and R is the steady-state nominal discount factor. Since the latter are also















I − At|T (i)
¤−1 µt|T (i),
that ﬁxes e βt (i)=γyt(i)Rt (i)πt (i).
The third parameter that is set in advance is ω, which governs the extent of
strategic complementarity. This is pinned down by the condition ω = a/(1−a), where
1−a is the Cobb-Douglas labor elasticity. We calibrated a =0 .3 when transforming
labor share data into a measure of real marginal cost (see the data description above),
and that ﬁxes ω =0 .429.
That leaves three free parameters, α, , and θ, which we estimate, for every draw
ϑi, by trying to satisfy the cross-equation restrictions described above. Letting ψi =
[αi,  i,θ i], these restrictions are:
z1t
¡












sAt|T (i) − χt (γ2t − γ1t)e
0
R(I − γ1tAt|T (i))
−1At|T (i)
−χt (γ2t − γ1t)e
0




20The variation shown here is less pronounced than that reported by Cogley and Sargent, who
studied a VAR involving diﬀerent variables.
21The VA Ris estimated for the log of gross inﬂation, so the local-to-date-t approximation of the
mean refers to net inﬂation. We exponentiate to restore the original units.
18z2t
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The parameters b1t,b 2t,γ1t,γ1t,e  t,ζt, and χt in (39) are deﬁn e da si n( 6 )w i t hπt (i),e βt (i),
and ω set in advance as described above. The moment conditions are indexed by t
because they depend on µt|T (i)a n dAt|T (i), which vary through time. Finally, the
steady-state value for real marginal cost is also calculated from VA Restimates, as
st (i)=e x p ( e0
s(I − At|T (i))−1µt|T (i)).
The moment condition zt (·)h a sd i m e n s i o n1+Np, where N =4i st h en u m b e r
of equations in the VA Rand p = 2 is the number of lags. A complete set of moment
conditions for all dates in the sample would therefore have dimension T(1 + Np).
Because the sample spans 174 quarters, the complete set of moment conditions would
have more than 1500 elements for estimating 3 parameters. That is both intractable
and unnecessary. Accordingly, we simplify by selecting 5 representative quarters,
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. (42)
Our selection of quarters is motivated as follows. First, we wanted a relatively
small number of dates in order to manage the dimension of the GMM problem. We
also wanted to space the dates apart because VA Restimates of µt and At in adjacent
quarters are highly correlated, which would result in high correlation across time in
the moment conditions zt (·). Highly correlated moment conditions would contribute
relatively little independent information for estimation and therefore would be close
to redundant.
Second, we wanted to span the variety of monetary experience in the sample.
Thus, we chose 1961 to represent the initial period of low and stable inﬂation prior
to the Great Inﬂation. The year 1978 represents the height of the Great Inﬂation,
when both trend inﬂation and the degree of persistence were close to their maxima.
The year 1983 represents the end of the Volcker disinﬂa t i o n ,w h i c hw er e g a r da s
a key turning point in postwar US monetary history. This is a point of transition
between the high inﬂation of the 1970s and the period of stability that followed, and
expectations may have been unsettled at that time. The ﬁnal two years, 1995 and
2003 are two points from the Greenspan era, a mature low-inﬂation environment.
19The ﬁrst was chosen to represent the pre-emptive Greenspan, the second reﬂects his
more recent wait-and-see approach.
We emphasize that the dates were chosen based on ap r i o r ireﬂection and rea-
soning, before estimating deep parameters. Exploring the sensitivity of our results to
alternative selections would be interesting, provided one does not mine the data too
interactively along the way.
With the function F deﬁned in (42), we estimate the vector of parameters ψ by
minimizing the unweighted sum of squares F0F. As the notation of (39) and (40)
indicate, we estimate best-ﬁtting values of ψ for every draw in the posterior sample
for the VA R , µt|T (i)a n dAt|T (i). In this way, we obtain a distribution of estimates
ψi =a r gm i n[ F(·)
0F(·)], (43)
for i =1 ,...,NMC. where NMC is the number of draws in the Monte Carlo simulation
for the ﬁrst-stage VA R . This allows us to assess how parameter uncertainty in the
ﬁrst-stage VA Rmatters for estimates of deep parameters. We also we estimate best-
ﬁtting values of ψ from the posterior mean of VA Restimates, µt|T and At|T.22
In what follows, the median estimate of deep parameters from the distribution
(43) is always close to the best-ﬁtting value derived from the posterior VA Rmean,
but a distribution of estimates is helpful for appraising uncertainty. In eﬀect, we
induce a probability distribution over ψi by applying a change of variables to the
distribution of VA Rparameters. The numerical optimizer that we adopt starts from
the same initial conditions for each draw and contains no random search elements,
so (43) implicitly expresses a deterministic function that uniquely determines the
deep parameters as a function of the VA Rparameters. Thus, a change-of-variables
interpretation is valid. It should be noted that the resulting distribution for ψi is not
a Bayesian posterior because it follows from the likelihood function for the reduced-
form model instead of the structural model. It is in fact a transformation of the
posterior for the reduced form parameters ϑ.23
We estimate two versions of the model, one in which the parameters in ψ are held
constant, and another where they are free to diﬀer across dates. In both cases, their
values are constrained to lie in the economically meaningful ranges listed in table 2.24
Furthermore, we verify that the parameters satisfy the conditions for existence of a
steady state (the inequalities (57) in appendix A).
22These are deﬁned as follows: µt|T = 1
NMC
PNMC




23For another approach to this problem, see Hong Li (2004).
24We also considered estimates obtained by minimizing a weighted sum of squares F(·)0WF(·).
Using the estimates in (43), we calculate the moment condition errors and their covariance, VF.
The weighting matrix W is the inverse of that matrix, W = V
−1
F . Because these weighted estimates
do not lead to a gain in precision, based on the median absolute deviation, we report only the
unweighted estimates.
20Table 2
Admissible Range for Estimates
α   θ
(0,1) [0,1] (1,∞)
5.1 NKPC with Constant Parameters
Estimates for the constant-parameter case are reported in table 3. Because the
distributions are non-normal, we focus on the median and median absolute deviation,
respectively, instead of the mean and the standard deviation. All three parameters
are economically sensible, the estimates accord well with microeconomic evidence,
and they are reasonably precise.
Table 3
Estimates when Calvo Parameters are Constant













One especially interesting outcome concerns the indexation parameter, which we
estimate at   =0 .25 This contrasts with much of the empirical literature based on
time-invariant models in which the indexation parameter is estimated as low as 0.2
and as high as 1, and is statistically signiﬁcant.26 In those models, an important
backward-looking component is needed to ﬁti n ﬂation persistence, but that is not
the case here. From a purely statistical point of view, a positive coeﬃcient on past
inﬂation may arise from an omitted-variable problem, since the omitted forward-
looking terms that belong to the model according to (4), but which are omitted from
estimators of standard Calvo models, may be positively correlated with past inﬂation.
Indeed, that is the case when inﬂation Granger-causes output growth and nominal
interest rate.
25To be more precise, 84.2 percent of the estimates lie exactly on the lower bound of 0. The mean
estimate is 0.022, and the standard deviation is 0.084. Only 3.3 percent of the estimates lie above
0.2.
26Sbordone (2003) estimates a   r a n g i n gf r o m0 . 2 2t o0 . 3 2 ,d e p e n d i n go nt h ep r o x yc h o s e nf o r
the marginal cost, in single equation estimates; Smets and Wouters (2002) in a general equilibrium
model, esimate a value of approximately 0.6. Giannoni and Woodford (2003) estimate a value close to
1. Other authors, following Gali and Gertler (1999), introduce a role for past inﬂation assuming the
presence of rule-of-thumb ﬁrms, instead of through indexation, and also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on lagged inﬂation.
21More substantially, we believe that allowing for a time-varying trend inﬂation in
the VA Rreduces the persistence of the gap ln(πt/πt), making it easier to match the
data with a purely forward-looking model. In other words, our estimates point to
a story in which the need for a backward-looking term arises because of neglect of
time-variation in lnπt. That neglect creates artiﬁcially high inﬂation persistence in
time-invariant VA R s , and hence a ‘persistence puzzle’ for forward-looking models.
In a drifting-parameter environment, however, the inﬂation gap is less persistent, and
a purely forward-looking model is preferred.
Another interesting result concerns the fraction of sticky-price ﬁrms, which we
estimate at α =0 .602 per quarter. In conjunc t i o nw i t ht h ee s t i m a t eo f  =0 ,
this implies a median duration of prices of 1.36 quarters, or 4.1 months,27 av a l u e
consistent with microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price adjustment. Bils
and Klenow (2004), for example, report a median duration of prices of 4.4 months,
which increases to 5.5 months after removing sales price changes, which are only
temporary reversals. Our estimate from macroeconomic data therefore accords well
with the conclusions they draw from microeconomic data.
In contrast, Calvo speciﬁcations estimated from time-invariant VA R st h a tr e -
quire a backward-looking indexation component are grossly inconsistent with their
evidence. When  >0, every ﬁrm changes price every quarter, some optimally re-
balancing marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost, others mechanically marking up prices
in accordance with the indexation rule. Unless the optimal rebalancing happened to
result in a zero price change or lagged inﬂation were exactly zero, conditions that
are very unlikely, no ﬁrm would fail to adjust its nominal price. In a world such as
that, Bils and Klenow would not have found that 75 percent of prices remain un-
changed each month. We interpret this as additional evidence in support of a purely
forward-looking model.
Finally, the estimate of θ implies a steady state markup of about 11 percent,
which is in line with other estimates in the literature. For example, this is the
same order of magnitude as the markups that Basu (1996) and Basu and Kimball
(1997) estimate using sectoral data. With economy-wide data, in the context of
general equilibrium models, estimates range from around 6 to 23 percent, depending
on the type of frictions in the model. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimate
a steady state markup of 15 percent (θ ≈ 7.8). Amato and Laubach (2003), in an
extended model which include also wage rigidity, estimate a steady-state markup
of 19 percent. Edge et al. (2003) ﬁnd a slightly higher value, 22.7 percent (θ =
5.41). The estimates in Christiano et al. (2003) span a larger range, varying from
around 6.35 to 20 percent, depending on details of the model speciﬁcation. All
27For a purely forward-looking Calvo model, the waiting time to the next price change can be
approximated as an exponential random variable (using a continuous approximation), and from that
one can calculate that the median waiting time is -ln(2)/ln(α). Note that the median waiting time
is less than the mean, because an exponential distribution has a long upper tail.
22the cited estimates on economy-wide data are obtained by matching theoretical and
empirical impulse response functions to monetary shocks. Although obtained through
ad i ﬀerent estimation strategy, our markup estimate falls within the range found by
others.
The model is overidentiﬁed, with 3 free parameters to ﬁt4 5e l e m e n t si nF (·). To











where b ψ =
h
b α,b  ,b θ
i
represent the best-ﬁtting values corresponding to the posterior
mean estimates of the VA Rparameters, µt|T and At|T, and Va r(F)i st h ev a r i a n c e






i=1 F(ψi,µ t|T (i),A t|T (i))F(ψi,µ t|T (i),A t|T (i))
0. (45)
If F(·) were approximately normal, J would be approximately chi-square with 42
degrees of freedom.28 We calculate J =2 2 .2, which falls far short of the chi-square
critical value. Thus, taken at face value, the model’s overidentifying restrictions are
not rejected. One should take this with a grain of salt, however, because of the non-
normality of the distributions for ψi and F(ψi,·). In any case, the J-statistic provides
no evidence against the over-identifying restrictions.
A complementary way of evaluating the model involves comparing the expected
inﬂation gap implied by the NKPC with the expected inﬂation gap estimated by
the unconstrained VA R , in the spirit of Campbell and Shiller’s (1987) exercise.29
The VAR inﬂation forecast is given by equation (11), while the NKPC forecast is
implicitly deﬁned by the right-hand-side of equation (12), which deﬁnes the model’s
cross-equation restrictions. Thus, the distance between the two forecasts measures
the extent to which the cross-equation restrictions are violated. Figure 4 plots the
two series, showing VAR forecasts in blue and NKPC forecasts in red.
As the ﬁgure shows, NKPC forecasts closely track those of the unrestricted VAR.
The correlation between the two series is 0.979, and the deviations are small in
magnitude and represent high-frequency twists and turns. Thus the unrestricted
VAR satisﬁes the cross-equation restrictions implied by the NKPC.
28There are 45 moment conditions and 3 free parameters.
29We choose to compare inﬂation forecasts, since eq. (4) doesn’t have a unique solution for
inﬂation as a function of real marginal costs.










Correlation = 0.979 
Figure 4: VAR and NKPC Forecasts of Inﬂation
5.2 NKPC with Variable Parameters
Next we relax the constraint that α,   and θ are constant across dates. When we
allow them to vary, we get the estimates recorded in table 4.
Table 4
Estimates when Calvo Parameters are Free to Vary


































































24Once again, we estimate   = 0 at all the chosen dates. There is, however, some
variation in the fraction piling up at zero in various years. This amounted to 74
percent in 1961, 57.5 percent in 1978, 91.4 percent in 1983, 95.3 percent in 1995,
and 91 percent in 2003. Thus, support for a purely forward-looking speciﬁcation is
strongest after the Volcker disinﬂation.
Similarly, the estimates of θ vary a little bit across years, but not a lot. The median
point estimates range from a low of 10.30 in 1978 to a high of 11.56 in 1983, values
that correspond to mark-ups of 10.8 and 9.5 percent, respectively. These estimates
of θ are slightly higher than the median estimate of 9.99 in the constant-parameter
version, but they are not dramatically higher.
T h ee s t i m a t eo fα, the fraction of sticky price ﬁrms, also varies slightly across
years. Interestingly, this parameter moves in the direction predicted by the New
Keynesian theory. For example, Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1998) say that prices
should be more ﬂexible when inﬂation is high and variable, and less ﬂexible when it
is low and stable. Although movements in α are not large (or statistically signiﬁcant),
that is what we ﬁnd here. Judging by the median point estimates, prices were most
ﬂexible (α was smallest) in 1978, when inﬂation was highest and most variable. For
that year, we estimate α =0 .567, which implies a median weighting time of 3.66
months to the next price adjustment, a value somewhat lower than what Bils and
Klenow estimate.30 Prices were least ﬂexible (α was highest) during the Greenspan
era, when inﬂation was lowest and most stable. For 1995 and 2003, we estimate
α equal to 0.672 and 0.682, respectively, which implies a median price duration of
roughly 5.3 months. This is somewhat higher than Bils and Klenow’s unconditional
estimate, but it accords well with what they ﬁnd after removing sales price changes
from their sample.
The next ﬁgure provides more detail about the time variation in the estimates.
This ﬁgures depicts histograms for each of the parameters in various years. The ﬁrst
ﬁve rows portray the time-varying estimates, one row for each of the chosen years,
and the last row shows the constant-parameter estimates discussed above. Each
histogram portrays estimates of α, , and θ for every draw of the VA Rparameters in
the Monte Carlo simulation, that is, 5000 estimates at each date.
There is little evidence here of important time variation in   or θ. For  ,w e
observe a pile up at zero in all years, as well as in the constant-parameter histogram.
T h ea m o u n to fm a s sa tz e r ov a r i e sa c r o s sy e a r s ,a sn o t e da b o v e ,b u ts t i l lt h e r ei s
little evidence of an important indexing or backward-looking component. Similarly,
the histograms for θ appear stable across dates, except perhaps for some hard-to-see
variation in the long upper tail.








































































































Figure 5 - Histograms for Calvo Parameters
There is slightly more evidence here of changes in α. The histograms for 1995 and
2003 clearly have a diﬀerent shape than those for 1978 or 1983. Notice, for example,
how they are shifted to the right and more disperse than those in earlier years. On
the other hand, the histograms for various years also overlap a lot, so it is not clear
how strong is the evidence for changes in α.
To dig a bit deeper, we calculated the probability of an increase in α across pairs
of years. Recall that we have a panel of estimates αit,i=1 ,...,NMC,a n dt =1961,
1978, 1983, 1995, 2003. That is, for each of the 5000 sample paths of VA Restimates
in the Monte Carlo sample, we estimate ﬁve α’s, one for each of the chosen years. On
each sample path i, we can check whether α increased between various dates. The
fraction of sample paths on which α increased is the probability we seek.
Those calculations are reported in the next table. Each entry refers to the prob-
ability that α increased from the column date to the row date. For example, the
ﬁrst row shows the probability of an increase between 1961 and 1978, 1961 and 1983,
and so on. Numbers smaller than 0.05 or larger than 0.95 may be taken as strong
26evidence of shifts in αt, with numbers close to zero indicating a signiﬁcant fall in αt
a n dn u m b e r sc l o s et o1as i g n i ﬁcant increase.
Table 5
Probability of an Increase in αt
1978 1983 1995 2003
1961 0.438 0.532 0.681 0.686
1978 0.625 0.713 0.713
1983 0.663 0.660
1995 0.517
None of the values shown here are strongly signiﬁcant. Many are not far from 0.5,
which says that α w a sj u s ta sl i k e l yt of a l la st or i s e .T h em o s ts i g n i ﬁcant movements
are between 1978 and 1995 or 2003, when we ﬁnd that α increased on approximately
72 percent of the sample paths. This goes in the right direction, but it falls short of
attaining statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels. At best, this represents weak
evidence of a change in α. If a change did occur, our estimates detect only a vague
trace of it.
Table 6 reports analogous calculations for θ. Once again, most of the probabilities
are not too far from 0.5, suggesting little evidence of a systematic change.
Table 6
Probability of an Increase in θt
1978 1983 1995 2003
1961 0.335 0.526 0.440 0.458
1978 0.686 0.573 0.587
1983 0.441 0.452
1995 0.517
This result is not surprising. The parameter θ captures the degree of compet-
itiveness and is related to the desired level of mark-up, µ = θ/(θ − 1). Procyclical
variations in θ imply countercyclical variations in the desired mark-up, and vice versa,
and at a theoretical level, both a countercyclical and a procyclical mark-up can be
supported.31 At an empirical level, evidence for the U.S. favors countercyclical mark-
ups (Bils 1987), while evidence for the U.K. favors procyclical mark-ups (Small 1997).
31For example, the model of implicit collusion of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) implies that
the mark-up is a positive function of the ratio of expected future proﬁts to current output, while
the customer market model of Phelps and Winter (1970) implies the opposite sign.
27It is therefore plausible that variation in trend inﬂation does not aﬀect the degree of
competitiveness one way or the other.32
Finally, in table 7, we provide an assessment of the probability that  t =0i n
the various periods. Although the median estimate is always zero, the evidence for a
purely forward-looking speciﬁcation is strongest after the Volcker disinﬂation.
Table 7
Probability  t =0
1961 1978 1983 1995 2003
0.739 0.576 0.914 0.952 0.909
Overall, the estimates do not point strongly toward variation in α, , and θ. Over
the range of monetary regimes experienced in our sample, the Calvo-pricing parame-
ters appear to be at least approximately invariant to shifts in policy rules. Accordingly,
we say the NKPC is structural for this class of policy interventions.
6T h e e ﬀe c to fp o s i t i v et r e n di n ﬂation
The traditional NKPC is obtained from an approximation around a steady state
with zero inﬂation. In contrast, we estimate a positive and time-varying level of trend
inﬂa t i o ni no u rVAR and approximate the local dynamics around that value. In this
section, we address how that alters the properties of the NKPC.
In ﬁgure 5, we show the implied coeﬃcients of the Calvo model, computed as in
(6) using the median estimates of α,  , and θ. Dashed lines represent the conven-
tional approximation, which assumes zero trend inﬂation at all dates, and solid lines
represent our approximation, which estimates ¯ πt from the VAR.
The shape of the time-varying NKPC parameters is clearly dictated by the dy-
namics of trend inﬂation. The parameter ζ, which represents the weight on current
marginal cost, varies inversely with ¯ π, while the three forward-looking coeﬃcients in
(4) vary directly. Thus, as trend inﬂation rises, the link between current marginal
cost and inﬂation is weakened, and the inﬂuence of forward-looking terms is enhanced.
This shift in price-setting behavior follows from the fact that positive trend inﬂation
accelerates the rate at which a ﬁrm’s relative price is eroded when it lacks an op-
portunity to reoptimize. This makes ﬁrms more sensitive to contingencies that may
prevail far in the future if their price remains stuck for some time. Thus, relative to
the conventional approximation, current costs matter less and anticipations matter
more.
32Khan and Moessner (2003) discuss the relation between competitiveness and trend inﬂation in
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.






































Figure 5: NKPC Coeﬃcients
Focusing more closely on the forward-looking coeﬃcients, notice that two of the
new terms appearing in (4) — those involving forecasts of output growth and a nominal
discount factor — are multiplied by the coeﬃcient χ(γ2−γ1). Figure 5 shows that this
coeﬃcient is always close to zero,33 so those terms make a negligible contribution to
inﬂation. In fact, when we omit them from equation (4), NKPC expected inﬂation is
virtually the same as that for the complete model shown in ﬁgure 4. Thus, the terms
Pe Rt and Pe γyt are largely a nuisance and can be neglected without doing too much
violence to the theory.
What matters more is how trend inﬂation alters the coeﬃcients on expected inﬂa-
tion, b1 and b2. Figure 5 shows that b1 ﬂips from slightly below 1 when trend inﬂation
is zero to around 1.05 or 1.1 for the values of ¯ πt that we estimate. Similarly, when
trend inﬂation is zero, b2 is also zero, and multi-step expectations of inﬂa t i o nd r o po u t
of equation (4). Those higher-order expectations enter with coeﬃcients of 0.02-0.04
when trend inﬂation is positive.
As Ascari and Ropele (2004) demonstrate, this shift is so strong that it threatens
the determinacy of equilibrium. When trend inﬂation is zero, we have b1 < 1a n d
b2 =0 , so we can solve forward to express current inﬂation in terms of an expected
geometric distributed lead of real marginal cost, as in Sbordone (2002, 2003). With






= Et(1 − γ1L
−1)
h





−1)=1− (γ1 + b1)L
−1 + γ1(b1 − b2)L
−2, (47)
33This is because γ2 ' γ1.





Figure 6 portrays λ1 and λ2 and shows how they vary with trend inﬂation. The
dashed line also reproduces the value of b1 that occurs when trend inﬂation is zero.
































Figure 6: Factorization of P(L−1)
For our estimates of b1,b 2, and γ1, we ﬁnd λ1 < 1 but λ2 > 1, which means that a
non-explosive forward solution is not guaranteed for arbitrary driving processes. That
does not necessarily imply that inﬂation is indeterminate, for a nonexplosive forward
solution could still exist if ˆ st+j converged to zero at a faster rate than λ
j
2 diverged.
The rate of mean reversion in ˆ st+j is a property of a general equilibrium, however, and
we cannot say much about it in the context of the limited information strategy that
we adopt in this paper. Suﬃce it to say that positive trend inﬂation diminishes the
weight on current marginal cost and increases the weight on future marginal cost, so
much so that determinacy of a forward solution is no longer guaranteed. Furthermore,
the threat arises even at the low levels of trend inﬂation experienced in the postwar
U.S.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we address whether the Calvo model of inﬂation dynamics is struc-
tural in the sense of Lucas (1976). In particular, we examine whether its parameters
are invariant to shifts in trend inﬂation, which we associate with diﬀerent policy
regimes.
30We ﬁrst derive the Calvo model as an approximate equilibrium condition around
an o n - z e r os t e a d y - s t a t ei n ﬂation rate and show that its coeﬃcients are nonlinear
combinations of deep parameters describing market structure, the pricing mechanism,
and trend inﬂation. We estimate deep parameters by exploiting the cross-equation
restrictions imposed by the model on a reduced form representation of the data.
We model the reduced form as a vector autoregression with time-varying parameters
and stochastic volatility, and then ask whether a Calvo-pricing model with constant
parameters can be ﬁt to that time-varying reduced form.
We ﬁnd that a constant-parameter version of the NKPC ﬁts very well indeed,
closely tracking the VAR inﬂation gap. The estimates are precise, economically sen-
sible, and accord well with microeconomic evidence. In addition, when we allow
Calvo-pricing parameters to vary over time, we ﬁnd little evidence of systematic
movements. Thus, the model appears to be structural for policy interventions that
may generate shifts in trend inﬂation of the magnitude of those in our sample.
One important insight that follows from our analysis concerns the importance of
backward-looking elements in the model. Our drifting-coeﬃcient VA Rsuggests that
trend inﬂation has been historically quite variable. We believe that measures of the
inﬂation gap that ignore this drift show an artiﬁcially high level of persistence, forcing
a role for past inﬂation in the standard Calvo model. In contrast, we show that no
indexation or backward-looking component is needed to explain inﬂation once shifts
in trend inﬂation are properly taken into account. In other words, a purely forward-
looking version of the NKPC ﬁts post WWII U.S. data very well.
A Appendix A: Derivation of the Calvo equation
with trend inﬂation
The fraction (1 − α)o fﬁrms that can set prices optimally choose nominal price Xt
(which is not indexed by ﬁrms, since each ﬁrm that change prices solves the same prob-












XtΨtj/Pt+j is the relative price of the ﬁrm at t+j; Rt,t+j is a nominal discount factor
between time t and t +j;a n dYt(i)i sﬁrms’ i output. The function Ψtj captures the




31and it is therefore deﬁned as
Ψtj =
½

























where MCt+j is the nominal marginal cost at t+j of the ﬁrm that changes its price
at t. Dividing through by YtP
θ+1
t we can express the equilibrium condition in terms
of the (stationary) growth rate of Y, (γy,t = Yt/Yt−1), stationary gross inﬂation πt,
and stationary relative prices (xt = Xt
Pt ). Furthermore, setting st+j,t (i)=
MCt+j,t(i)
Pt+j ,














we obtain expression (1) in the text.













αRγyπ(θ− (θ−1))¢j . (55)
If both αRγyπ1+θ(1− )(1+ω) and αRγyπ(θ− (θ−1)) are less than 1, the two inﬁnite sums






1 − αRγyπθ− (θ−1)
1 − αRγyπ1+θ(1− )(1+ω)
!
s. (56)















Combining (56) with the aggregate price condition (2) evaluated at the steady state,
x =
µ





34For any value of π,R, and γy, there exists values of the pricing parameters for which these
inequalities hold. For example, if trend inﬂation were very high, then α . =0m i g h tb en e e d e dt o
satisfy these inequalities. But that makes good economic sense, for the higher is trend inﬂation the
more ﬂexible prices are likely to be. Our estimates always satisfy these bounds.






1 − αRγyπ1+θ(1− )(1+ω)










In the particular case of zero steady-state inﬂation (π =1 ) , or perfect indexation
(  = 1), the expression for the aggregate price level reduces to x =1 , hence, by (56),
s = θ−1
θ .
The log-linearization of the optimal price equation (1) and of the aggregate price
evolution (2) around a steady state with inﬂation π are respectively
b xt =











b Rt,t+j + b st+j +
j X
k=1
b γy,t+k +[ 1+θ(1 + ω)]
j X
k=1


















b γy,t+k + θ
j X
k=1










(b πt −  b πt−1), (61)
where the symbols are deﬁn e di n( 7 )i nt h et e x t .
Combining these two equations, simplifying the double sums, and collecting terms,
we obtain
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where γ1 and γ2 are also deﬁned in (7) in the text. Finally, we evaluate this expression
at t+1, multiplyitbyγ2, and subtract its expected value from (62). Collecting terms,
we obtain expression (4) in the text.
33B Appendix B: Simulating the Posterior Density










summarizes beliefs about the evolution of the drifting parameters and static hyperpa-
rameters. This posterior is simulated via the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm







where f(ΘT,Ψ|XT) is the posterior corresponding to the model that does not impose
the stability constraint which rules out explosive VA Rroots. Therefore a sample from
p(ΘT,Ψ|XT) can be drawn by simulating f(ΘT,Ψ|XT) and discarding realizations
that violate the stability constraint. They also develop a ‘Metropolis within Gibbs’







using the forward-ﬁltering, backward-
sampling algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994). This step relies on the Kalman
ﬁlter and a recursion analogous to the Kalman smoother to update conditional
means and variances.





. This is a standard inverse-Wishart prob-
lem.






,w h e r eh−it denotes the rest of the hit vector at dates
other than t. This step exploits the stochastic volatility algorithm of Jacquier,
Polson, and Rossi (1994).





. This is a standard draw from an inverse-
gamma density.





. This is a Bayesian regression, and it is
also standard.
The sequence of draws from the conditional submodels forms a Markov Chain
that converges to a draw from the joint density, f(ΘT,Ψ|XT). T h es a m p l ef r o mt h e
unrestricted model can then be transformed into a sample from the restricted model,
p(ΘT,Ψ|XT), via rejection sampling. Details of each step and a justiﬁcation for
rejection sampling can be found in the appendices to Cogley and Sargent (2004).
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